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The Navy’s Fleet is in need of tactical voice communication systems that are highly 
reliable, protected from cyber threats, and able to operate in a denied or degraded 
environment. Many of the Navy’s current systems rely on outdated and inefficient 
technology, which reduces the overall effectiveness of our tactical communication 
channels and also limits the accessibility of these systems to communications challenged 
areas within ships. 
This research examines the capabilities, limitations, and overall performance of an 
integrated Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) system using four popular link layer 
protocols (i.e., Ethernet, 802.11n, 2.4 GHz 802.11ac, and 5 GHz 802.11ac) in an attempt 
to determine the feasibility of incorporating VoIP technology within Consolidated Afloat 
Networks and Enterprise Services and digital modular radio communication systems. The 
specific features compared in this study are VoIP network bandwidth consumption, 
overall network capacity between the four link layer protocols, VoIP codecs, VoIP call 
limits, intrusion detection system effects, and the effects of additional non-VoIP network 
traffic. 
The results of the study show that afloat tactical communications can be 
effectively enhanced by integrating VoIP intrusion detection systems monitored VoIP 
network applications with afloat communications systems, and by extending those 
systems with wireless devices utilizing the 802.11ac protocol. 
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A. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
The Navy’s fleet is in need of tactical voice communication systems that are 
highly reliable, secured from cyber threats, and able to operate in a denied or degraded 
environment [1]. Many of the Navy’s current systems rely on outdated and inefficient 
technology, which significantly reduces the overall effectiveness of our tactical 
communication channels. This limited technology also restricts the accessibility of these 
systems to communications challenged areas within the ship. 
B. DISCUSSION AND MOTIVATION 
Recent Naval training exercises and experiments have successfully utilized 
integrated voice over internet protocol (VoIP) systems to provide efficient and reliable 
communications in ways that have not been possible in the past [2]. These successes 
clearly illustrate the potential upside of increased incorporation of this technology into 
fleet systems. 
There are numerous flaws with the current afloat, line-of-site, voice 
communications architecture in the Navy. The systems are unreliable, easily degraded, 
and depend on extremely inefficient technology. The Navy has been using these same 
types of communication systems for “transoceanic and transcontinental communication 
traffic” since 1924 [3]. Modern navies work in a new digital era of high-speed, readily 
available and extremely efficient cyber communication technologies. One of the most 
prominent new audio cyber technologies is VoIP. VoIP gives us the ability to send audio 
communications over a digital packet-switched network with little-to-no signal loss. The 
purpose of this thesis is to explore how VoIP can be used to meet the Navy’s growing 
need for a cutting-edge, extremely reliable, and efficient means of communications 
afloat. 
Additionally, current afloat communication systems do not have the ability to 
extend access to certain areas within ships. When other military units come aboard a 
Navy ship, they are limited to specific locations where they can access the current tactical 
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communication channels. This is especially troublesome for Marines embarked onboard 
amphibious craft within the well-decks of Navy ships. They currently have no way of 
accessing tactical communications until outside the “skin” of the ship. Implementation of 
VoIP communication channels on these ships will provide a number of mechanisms 
through which embarked units can gain access throughout the ship. 
C. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
This research provides an assessment of current and future afloat tactical 
communications systems, their interoperability, and the various transmission media used, 
as well as an assessment of current VoIP technologies and systems used in military and 
corporate environments, and the benefits and concerns of each. In particular, this work 
focuses on identifying ways to improve tactical communications by augmenting current 
systems with protected VoIP systems, integrating VoIP technology within shipboard 
networks, and wirelessly extending VoIP data to areas not covered by current 
communications systems. 
The study assesses the integration of VoIP systems with tactical communication 
systems and networks afloat. It analyzes how VoIP systems may affect the quality of 
service of an afloat network. It also identifies the possible cyber security risks and 
mitigations of introducing a VoIP system to an afloat network. 
The research examines the capabilities, limitations, and overall performance of an 
integrated VoIP system in an attempt to determine the feasibility of incorporating VoIP 
technology within Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES) and 
digital modular radio (DMR) communication systems. This was done by comparing 
multiple features of the following four popular link layer protocols: Ethernet, 802.11n, 
2.4 GHz 802.11ac and 5 GHz 802.11ac. The specific features compared in this study 
were VoIP network bandwidth consumption, overall network capacity between the four 
link layer protocols, VoIP codecs, VoIP call limits, intrusion detection system effects, 
and the effects of additional non-VoIP network traffic. 
Overall, the purpose is to provide a recommendation for specific ways that VoIP 
systems can be used to improve and extend tactical communications afloat, the hardware 
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and software that could be used, the systems that can be integrated, and efficient 
transmission media for expansion to communications-challenged areas. 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The integration of VoIP systems with specific afloat communication systems has 
the potential to create numerous benefits to the fleet. These systems can reduce the 
electromagnetic (EM) footprint of afloat platforms, by exchanging numerous analog 
voice circuits for a lesser number of digital voice channels. They will also decrease the 
hardware footprint onboard ships and can decrease the equipment and maintenance costs 
associated with that hardware. Digital VoIP technology allows for the integration of 
multiple shipboard communications systems as well. VoIP systems can give ships the 
ability to extend communications to areas onboard that may not have previously been 
possible, such as the well deck and temporary locations for embarkable units. This can be 
facilitated by leveraging existing wired and wireless networks. These systems increase 
the reliability and availability of our tactical voice communication channels as well. 
These channels can then be maneuverable within the electromagnetic spectrum, leading 
to greater jam resistance. Increased communications security will also be available 
through various cyber security technologies. Integrating VoIP systems afloat will 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. AFLOAT TACTICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS  
Tactical communication systems afloat are the backbone of the Navy’s 
warfighting architecture. For tactical voice communications outside the skin of the ship, 
the primary medium used by our military has been, and is currently, analog radio 
frequency (RF). The only tactical voice transmitted within the skin of the ship is on a 
wired legacy system with its own specific access points. There are three primary 
frequency ranges that have typically been used for voice communications in the RF 
spectrum: 
 High frequency (HF): From 3 to 30 MHz, used for voice and data in 
beyond line of site (BLOS) communications, with ranges over thousands 
of miles. 
 Very high frequency (VHF): from 30 to 300 MHz, used in line of site 
(LOS) communications, for passing voice and data from ship-to-ship, 
ship-to-shore and ship-to-air. 
 Ultra high frequency (UHF): from 300 MHz to 3 GHz, used as the primary 
means for providing tactical, operational and administrative voice and data 
information.  
The primary block of the RF spectrum used for tactical communications afloat is 
from 255 to 400 MHz. UHF. The extremely high frequency (EHF) range, 30 to 300 GHz, 
is now starting to be used more frequently for satellite-based communication 
(SATCOM). The super high frequency range, 3 to 30 GHz has been used in the past, but 
this range has become quite saturated and is now primarily used for digital 
communication systems. In today’s Navy, non-SATCOM circuits still provide the 
preferred means for tactical voice communications. 
1. Radio Communication Systems 
The Navy has used a number of radio communications systems throughout the 
years, some of the most recent being the AN/WSC-3, the digital modular radio (DMR), 
and the Battle Force Tactical Network (BFTN). These systems are discussed below. 
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a. AN/WSC-3 
The AN/WSC-3, often referred to as the “Whiskey-3,” transceiver has been one of 
the Navy’s primary means of LOS communications since about 1983 [4] and is still being 
used on many naval vessels. The AN/WSC-3 operates in the UHF spectrum range, from 
225 to 399.975 MHz, using amplitude and frequency modulation techniques [5]. It is 
capable of both LOS and satellite communications, and its high transmit power allows for 
reliable communications over long distances. However, the AN/WSC-3 is an old radio 
and has extremely high downtime and maintenance costs. This radio is currently being 
replaced by the Navy’s digital modular radio. 
b. Digital Modular Radio 
The DMR is the newest radio used for tactical voice communications in the Navy. 
The DMR is a software-defined radio. These extremely versatile digital radios can be 
configured with a number of different software packages in order to communicate on 
multiple types of waveforms. While the term “waveform” has various interpretations, 
suffice it to say that compatibility between radio systems, and often the applications 
supported by these systems, requires that each device generate and process the 
appropriate waveforms. These waveforms tell the DMR how to interpret the RF signal, 
and give it the ability to communicate with numerous types of other radios. The DMR 
operates anywhere from 2 MHz to 2 GHz providing capability in the HF, VHF, and UHF 
spectrums. One DMR is capable of operating on four channels simultaneously (see 
Figure 1). A full DMR suite can handle up to 128 simultaneous channels through its 
human machine interface [6]. The system is being further developed with upgrades 
planned to provide HF broadband capabilities to support a net-centric environment while 





Figure 1.  Basic DMR Architecture, from [5] 
c. Battle Force Tactical Network  
BFTN is another tactical communication system used for wireless transmission of 
voice and data between surface, air, submarine, and shore based units. Typically, BFTN 
is used to transmit digital data rather than tactical audio communications, though audio 
communication capability is present. This system uses the HF and UHF frequency ranges 
to transmit low data-rate digital information, such as email and chat. It supports 
encrypted communications within the Department of Defense (DOD) and between DOD 
and its coalition partners as well. Ongoing upgrades to this system provide for HF and 
UHF LOS data links of up to 0.128 Mbps and 1.9 Mbps, respectively [5]. 
2. Network Communication Systems 
Three of the most prolific network communications systems used by the Navy 
today are the Automated Digital Network System (ADNS), Integrated Shipboard 
Network System (ISNS), and Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services 
(CANES). 
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a. Automated Digital Network System   
ADNS [5] is the primary afloat traffic management system for Internet Protocol 
(IP) connections to and from shipboard networks. The newest version is ADNS 
Increment III, which is used on large, force-level platforms such as carriers and 
amphibious ships. It supports data rates between 25 and 50 Mbps. Increment III supports 
IP version 4 and 6 hosted VoIP, video, and data traffic. 
One of the main functions of ADNS is to provide quality of service (QoS) 
dynamic bandwidth management. This provides the ability to allocate bandwidth in real 
time to the highest priority systems and networks. Traffic priority is categorized based on 
guidance from Fleet Cyber Command. Traffic markings necessary for prioritization are 
implemented by the Blue Coat Packet Shaper [7], an application traffic management 
device with the ability to monitor, control, and improve traffic flow. Traffic priority 
markings provided by the packet shaper, give administrators a greater situational 
awareness of the status of traffic and QoS changes on the network. 
b. Integrated Shipboard Network System  
ISNS is the Navy’s current shipboard network architecture. It provides a typical 
access or integrated local area network (LAN) infrastructure to connect client 
workstations, printers, servers, and other network equipment. It is the backbone for all of 
the ship’s command, control, communications, computers and intelligence networked 
applications. ISNS’ core set of applications and services are provided by a suite of 
government-off-the-shelf and commercial-off-the-shelf products known as the Common 
PC Operating System Environment. Unfortunately, much of the hardware and software 
components that make up ISNS is no longer supported. ISNS is now being replaced by a 
new and improved network infrastructure known as CANES. 
c. Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services 
CANES is the newest network system to be fielded in the fleet to replace all of the 
Navy’s older and outdated computing systems. CANES includes many improvements 
over previous systems in areas such as “tailored profiles and information management, 
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collaboration, information discovery, information exchange, and information storage” 
[5]. It is based around a common computing environment (CCE) for enhanced 
performance, improved maintenance, and a better overall end-user experience. CANES 
provides QoS through a series of service level agreement thresholds, enforced by a 
service level management system. This allows for a more detailed level of prioritization 
than in previous systems. Unlike other computing environments, CANES is built to 
directly support VoIP traffic on specific enclaves. This will allow for VoIP 
communications, internally, as well as with other ships and shore sites connected to 
Defense Information Systems Agency enterprise networks. 
The following is an abbreviated list of some of the major components in the 
CANES architecture [5]: 
 CANES  network devices 
 Cisco C3750G switches 
 Cisco C3750V2 switches 
 Cisco C3750X switches 
 Cisco C2921 routers 
 CANES  end-devices and software 
 HPZ200 small form factor workstations 
 Panasonic Toughbook CF-52 Laptops 
 HP t5745 Thin Clients 
 XEROX printers 
 Cisco EnviroXtreme 7962 handsets 
 Windows 7 Professional 64 bit OS 
 Red Hat Bare Metal OS v 5.3 
 SecureOffice Trusted Thin Client Software 
 CANES Data Center Devices and Software 
 Netra SPARC T3-1 Servers 
 vSphere Enterprise 4.1 ESX 
 vCenter Server 4 Standard 
 vCenter Site Recovery Manager 
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 Solaris Global Zone 
 Solaris 10 U7 for SPARC 
 Microsoft Windows Server Datacenter 2008 
 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Standard 
 IBM Blade Center HTs 
 Cisco Catalyst Switch Module 3110G 
 HS22V blades 
 IBM DS3512 Express Dual Controller Storage System 
 IBM EXP3512 Express Chassis 
Aside from the hardware and software that CANES provides to the fleet, the 
system’s major design improvement is its use of the CCE. The CCE is based on the 
concept of taking many services and applications that are currently hosted on separate 
servers, each running its own particular operating system and putting them all into a 
common network and set of servers. This consolidation is made possible through 
virtualization technologies using service-oriented architectures. CANES is currently 
being developed to bring together 37 separate core services and applications [8]. Through 
this consolidation of services and equipment, the CANES CCE allows for easier system 
upgrades and updates, higher quality administration, an increase in availability of 
services, and a reduced hardware footprint. 
B. VOIP 
In order to understand how VoIP can be integrated with afloat tactical 
communications systems (i.e., CANESs and DMRs), it is beneficial to know more about 
certain aspects of the technology. This research will further analyze three such aspects: 
the development of VoIP technology, the specific protocols in which VoIP operates upon, 
and VoIP security. 
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1. VoIP Development 
Voice over Internet Protocol is one of the most commonly used communication 
technologies today and has become popular worldwide [9], [10].1 It has numerous uses 
both in the consumer market and private homes. VoIP technology has also taken hold in 
the corporate sector. Many militaries are now using VoIP for a multitude of applications, 
as well. 
a. The VoIP of the Past 
The VoIP concept began in the 1990s when PC enthusiasts realized they could 
send voice data over the Internet instead of using the typical Public Switched Telephone 
Network (PSTN). This required both users to have a microphone and speakers connected 
to a computer with Internet connectivity while running compatible VoIP communication 
software. VocalTec, Inc., released the first Internet phone program in 1995 [11]. Around 
1998, VoIP technology expanded to include calls from PCs to phones as well. By the 
year 2000, about three percent of all voice traffic was sent via VoIP [11]. BBC News 
Correspondent Mark Ward in 2004 cited Internet pioneers such as Vint Cerf in predicting 
that “the net will stop being a part of the telephone network, and instead the telephone 
network will become a part of the net” [12]. With current trends, this prediction appears 
to be coming to fruition. 
b. The VoIP of Today 
Three of the largest communities leveraging VoIP are the consumer market, the 
corporate sector, and military organizations. No matter where it’s used, in order to be a 
reliable technology, VoIP must be available on demand. According to Mehmet Toy of the 
Information and Communication Technology book series, “Services such as broadcast 
video, voice over IP, and video on demand require five-nines availability, which means a 
high-level [of] survivability against failures” [13]. VoIP services with such a degree of 
reliability are now typically offered in cable and Internet bundles from major service 
                                                 
1 Section 1 is derived from a prior Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) research paper of the author, 
titled, “The Development of VoIP” [10]. 
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providers, for instance, AT&T U-verse, Comcast Xfinity, and Verizon FiOS. Third party 
companies like Ooma, Vonage, and MagicJack, offer VoIP services via a home Internet 
connection and some additional equipment for a nominal fee. Other companies, such as 
Google and Skype, offer free VoIP services through web-based and computer-based 
software that allows users to access VoIP services using any Internet connection. The 
smartphone industry has quickly taken to this concept as well, with numerous third party 
applications (e.g., Viber, talkatone, text+) being developed to allow for VoIP 
communications via a phone’s data plan or nearby wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) network. 
With the emergence of an all-packet-switched cellphone infrastructure, such as long-term 
evolution (LTE), packet-oriented voice capabilities are necessary to allow the cellular 
industry to move away from the circuit-switched voice systems of third generation and 
earlier systems [14]. 
Outside of the consumer market, VoIP is becoming the preferred communications 
method for businesses and military organizations as well [15], [16]. VoIP has provided an 
inexpensive solution for communications within and between businesses using their 
current IP network infrastructure, thus eliminating the need for a telephone service 
provider and separate telephone infrastructure. Certain companies also offer services to 
link communications between VoIP networks and the PSTN. Current provider exemplars 
include Jive, Nextiva, MPROCOM, VoIP DITO, and Onsip. Much like the corporate 
world, the military is leveraging VoIP communication solutions as well. Shore 
commands like Tactical Training Group Pacific use VoIP for exercise, coordination, and 
business communications. VoIP has large military implications in areas such as 
communications within and between commands and ships, hastily-formed 
communications in support of training evolutions, and secure communications. 
Unfortunately, the Navy’s afloat community has been slow to adopt VoIP, which has 
only recently begun to make its way to the fleet through the CANES system [5]. 
c. The VoIP of the Future 
VoIP has had tremendous growth and development, and the trend is expected to 
continue for many years [9]. VoIP’s future will likely hold developments such as new 
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protocols, new applications of the technology, and a possible full takeover of the 
telecommunications industry. New protocols have been, and will continue to be, 
developed based upon VoIP technology. VoIP continues to be further integrated into 
wired, Wi-Fi, and cellular networks and devices. One of many VoIP researchers 
(Axvoice) supports this assertion, and states that some other factors contributing to the 
expansion of VoIP include “better call quality, low cost of making phone calls, 
portability, and flexibility of use” [9]. Whether it is new protocols, new uses, or a new 
standard for telecommunications all together, VoIP technology will account for an 
increasing share of U.S. telecommunications infrastructure in years to come as depicted 
in Figures 2 and 3. Current shipboard environments stand to benefit from fully integrating 
such a persistent, evolving, and expanding technology as VoIP. 
 
Figure 2.  Fixed Landline Subscribers in the U.S., from [9] 
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Figure 3.  Total VoIP Subscribers in the U.S., from [9] 
2. VoIP 101 
VoIP consists of a suite of different protocols that work together to deliver 
multimedia data between users. The two major signaling protocols used in different VoIP 
architectures are H.323 and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [17]. Many other protocols 
are used that either assist the signaling protocols, transfer multimedia data, or perform 
various other VoIP support functions. Since the technology is IP-based, it relies on a 
number of other non-VoIP-specific protocols. Aside from just the design of the protocol, 
there is an entire vocabulary unique to VoIP as well. 
Any major communications technology typically comes with its own specific 
vocabulary that describes the same types of devices with a unique set of terms, and VoIP 
is no different. The end devices (e.g., PCs, VoIP phones, telephones) are typically 
referred to as endpoints or user-agents (UAs). More specifically, they are the user-agent 
client (UAC), used to create the call request, and the user-agent server (UAS), used to 
receive the call request. Each UA can function as either the client or server, depending on 
who initiates the call. A computer-based VoIP application that uses a device’s audio 
components is known as a “soft phone,” whereas a hardware-based VoIP phone that 
directly connects to a network is known as a “hard phone.” There are many different 
types of VoIP servers, some that can be on the same device, some that have similar 
names to other network servers, and some that perform the same functions but have 
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entirely different names. These are VoIP devices such as registrar servers, proxy servers, 
redirect servers, gateways, gatekeepers, and multipoint control units [17]. 
One of the two prevailing VoIP signaling protocols is H.323. This protocol was 
built as a foundation for transmitting communication data over IP networks. It is 
excellent for transmitting (and transforming) VoIP data across many different types of 
networks, from the integrated services digital network to the PSTN, and even cellular 
networks. It performs somewhat similarly to the PSTN’s signaling protocol Signaling 
System Number 7. H.323 does not have much security by design; however, it does rely 
on the H.235 set of protocols for authentication security [17]. 
There are a number of devices used in a typical H.323 architecture including the 
H.323 gateway, call manager, and gatekeeper. The H.323 gateway provides the 
translation and interface between H.323 and other protocols and networks such as SIP 
and PSTN. The call manager is the VoIP supervisor. It directs all calls for the network 
and controls the services and features provided to the UAs. Finally, the gatekeeper is used 
for signaling and directory services for calls across multiple networks. A simple Cisco 
H.323 system is shown in Figure 4, along with a basic call establishment diagram in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 4.  Basic H.323 Network Diagram, from [18] 
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Figure 5.  Typical H.323 Session Establishment, from [19] 
Another of the most prevalent signaling protocols used in VoIP systems is SIP. 
Defined in RFC 3261, SIP is a text-based application protocol for VoIP signaling, 
specifically for call setup and tear down [20]. Being text based, it is similar to the popular 
Hyper Text Transmission Protocol (HTTP). This characteristic also makes it a very 
versatile and simple-to-implement signaling protocol. Some of the major text-based 
functions, or request types, of SIP are: INVITE, ACK, BYE, CANCEL, REGISTER, 
OPTIONS, SUBSCRIBE, and NOTIFY. The possible responses are categorized by series 
numbers corresponding to response types as follows: 100—informational, 200—success, 
300—redirection, 400—client error, 500—server error, and 600—global failure. The 
reader may note that these are also very similar to the categorization of HTTP responses. 
SIP uses a process semantically similar to the transmission control protocol (TCP) three-
way handshake. Much like H.323, SIP relies on other protocols to provide security for its 
transmissions. 
SIP VoIP networks tend to be smaller in scale than H.323 networks, due to the 
simplicity of the underlying protocol.  That is not to say that they cannot be scaled to 
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larger or multiple networks, though. To expand a SIP network, a SIP proxy is used. The 
SIP proxy performs many of the same functions as the H.323 gateway, gatekeeper and 
call manager. A typical SIP network and a message flow diagram are depicted in Figures 
6 and 7. 
 
Figure 6.  Basic SIP Network Diagram, from [18] 
 
Figure 7.  Typical SIP Session Message Flow, from [21] 
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In addition to the two major signaling protocols, VoIP relies on a slew of other 
application layer protocols for a variety of different functions. Some other signaling 
protocols (most of which are typically proprietary) used are Skype, the Inter Asterisk 
Exchange protocol, and the Microsoft Live Communications Server protocol. There are 
also protocols designed to specifically support SIP and H.323, such as Session 
Description Protocol for session description information, H.245 for call control, and 
H.235 for authentication security. Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) is the primary 
protocol used for streaming the audio or video data over TCP or User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP). The details of RTP are described in RFC 3550 [22]. The RTP Control Protocol is 
another heavily relied on protocol [17]. It is used for quality control and tracks things like 
jitter, packet loss and synchronization data [17].  
Not only does VoIP use IP protocols like TCP and UDP to transmit its 
information, it relies on other non-VoIP-specific protocols for support as well. These are 
protocols such as Domain Name System for address resolution, Dynamic Host Control 
Protocol for dynamic address assignment, and Trivial File Transfer Protocol to transfer 
configuration information. By relying on so many major IP-based protocols, VoIP 
services are affected by threats to these protocols as well as those specific to VoIP. 
A typical VoIP system can consist of anywhere from two basic softphone end 
devices, to a suite of multiple gateways and networks that are integrated with a Private 
Branch Exchange (PBX) system bridging to the PSTN. The minimum VoIP components 
required to extend tactical radio communications are end devices, a proxy server, a 
gateway, and a form of inter-connection for radio integration. The end devices must 
provide services like push-to-talk and conferencing. The proxy server or call manager 
provides specific services to associated devices, call control, and various other functions. 
The gateway provides versatility to connect to other VoIP networks [17]. The ability to 
bridge calls to the PSTN is unnecessary; however, with the enormous interoperability of 
VoIP, this feature could be looked at in future research as a means to further expand 




digital data. Finally, various other components such as gatekeepers, wireless access 
points, and IDSs, may be necessary depending on the specific systems, protocols used, 
and capabilities required. 
3. VoIP Cyber Security 
Similar to TCP/IP, the VoIP protocol has its own unique set of vulnerabilities, 
attacks targeting those vulnerabilities, risks, and mitigations for those risks. 
a. Vulnerabilities 
The protocols used in IP networks upon which VoIP relies are known to contain 
potentially exploitable vulnerabilities [23]. There are three major areas in a VoIP system 
that can create vulnerabilities: device or network misconfigurations, underlying OS and 
protocol vulnerabilities, and VoIP-specific vulnerabilities. All network systems can suffer 
either of the first two types of vulnerabilities; however, this research will focus on those 
specific to VoIP. 
106 VoIP-associated vulnerabilities have been reported since 2002 by the DHS-
sponsored National Vulnerability Database [23]. Compared to the entire list of over 
64,000 vulnerabilities reported since 1999, this may seem insignificant. However, since 
most VoIP systems rely on the same set of protocols and standards as a typical network, 
in addition to those specific to VoIP, the number of potential vulnerabilities in a VoIP 
system are actually quite large. 
One unique aspect of VoIP is that most of its functionality resides in the end 
devices, as opposed to servers. This means that security and authenticity must be pushed 
to, and focused on, the end devices. Another unique security aspect of VoIP is that it uses 
multiple port and protocol combinations, creating a much larger potential attack surface. 
Many protocols used by VoIP have similar functionality to other major network 
protocols, which means there are similar types of vulnerabilities. However, with the 
technology’s large need to provide QoS, the primary focus of VoIP-based attacks is 
denial of service (DoS) oriented. It does not help that DoS attacks are some of the easiest 
and most popular to employ. 
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The dynamic nature of VoIP makes it extremely difficult to protect using typical 
IP security methods. Therefore, various VoIP-specific security protocols have been 
created. H.235 is one of the few security protocols specifically for VoIP traffic. It 
provides only authentication protection. There are, however, issues with H.235’s 
supporting protocols. Many of them use elements of variable lengths, and many VoIP 
systems are not programmed to have bounds checking on these elements. This leaves 
H.235 vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks leading to DoS, system crashes, and possible 
unintentional code execution [17]. 
b. Attacks 
Many VoIP-specific attacks focus on the SIP, H.323, and RTP protocols. SIP and 
H.323 depend on trust relationships between nodes for security. They do not have any 
built-in authentication and rely on protocols like H.235, Transport Layer Security (TLS), 
and Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) for such security aspects. The protocol that carries 
the content, RTP, is connectionless and has no means of determining whether or not its 
packets are received. This makes it extremely difficult to track the state of ongoing 
conversations in VoIP systems, which creates a perfect situation for DoS attacks. 
Popular DoS attacks can be targeted at both the stateful VoIP signaling protocols 
and the stateless media transfer protocols. The INVITE Attack [24] sends a large number 
of INVITE requests to a specific host in an attempt to both overwhelm the number of 
calls it can manage and to exhaust the proxy server’s resources for storing information on 
all calls. The BYE Attack [24] sends false tear down messages to either party in a call in 
an attempt to make either one falsely believe the other is ready to stop transmitting, thus 
ending the call. The CANCEL Attack [24] is similar; however, it attempts to send a 
CANCEL response to the UAC before the UAS can respond, which prevents the call 
from being established. The Call Hijack Attack [25] sends a false re-INVITE message to 
the caller with a new IP and port configuration, redirecting the establishment of the call to 
a potentially malevolent party, in an attempt to kill or intercept the call. 
Similar to the INVITE Attack, there are also many VoIP-based DoS flooding 
attacks. These attacks aim to exhaust the resources of either the server, end device, or the 
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path between them. The Reflector Attack [24] (similar to a Smurf Attack) uses zombie 
computers to send spoofed messages to open SIP servers with the victim as the source, 
thus having the servers flood the victim with false responses. RTP Flooding [24] is an 
extremely popular and easy means of denying service to a system due to RTP’s stateless 
nature. This attack simply uses brute force to send as many RTP packets to the target as 
possible in an attempt to exhaust bandwidth and other resources. Not only does this deny 
the target, it denies or degrades the connections of other users on the network, especially 
those with VoIP connections requiring little to no delay. TCP, UDP, and other IP-based 
flooding attacks can hurt the availability of VoIP connections as well.  
Flash crowds can also create major flood-like problems for VoIP. A flash crowd 
occurs when a large number of legitimate users attempt to access the VoIP server or 
services at the same time. The primary issue is that it becomes extremely difficult for the 
VoIP server to distinguish between real traffic and traffic from a flooding attack [26]. 
There are a number of other attacks, not necessarily DoS-based, specifically 
targeted against VoIP as well. These attacks range from simple scanning and enumeration 
to actual manipulation of the data being transmitted. The previously mentioned Call 
Hijack Attack, for example, can be used for more than just denial. By redirecting the 
caller to a malicious callee, a third party can reestablish the call and listen in without the 
caller ever knowing. Similar to the Call Hijack Attack, Registration Hijacking [25] can 
place a false callee into the conversation. However, it does this by convincing the 
registration server to replace the real callee’s address with its own. Much like other major 
protocol attacks, VoIP attacks can falsify data for financial gain. The Billing and Toll 
Fraud Attacks [24] send a false BYE message to a proxy server to make it believe, and 
record, that the call has ended, when in fact it has not ended. 
One VoIP-specific attack that is similar to other telecom and IP-based attacks is 
called Spam-over-Internet-Telephony (SPIT) [26]. SPIT is the VoIP version of spam (i.e., 
unsolicited emails), and telemarketing or political action calls. Instead of receiving a 
barrage of unwanted e-mails, the victim receives a number of unwanted VoIP phone 
calls. 
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A number of tools have been developed to carry out such attacks, both VoIP and 
non-VoIP specific [27]. These tools and their functions include but are not necessarily 
limited to: 
 Sniffing (e.g, VOIPong, VoMIT, SIPomatic) 
 Scanning and enumeration (e.g., SIP-Scan, SIPcrack, SMAP) 
 Packet creation/ flooding (e.g., SIPNess, SIPBomber, RTP Flooder) 
 VoIP fuzzing (e.g., Asteroid, PROTOS, Sip-Proxy) 
 VoIP signaling manipulation (e.g., IAXAuthJack, IAXHangup, SIP-Kill) 
 VoIP media manipulation (e.g., RTP MixSound, RTPInject, RTPProxy) 
Various other tools exist as well from those that carry out dictionary attacks to those that 
are specifically for spamming. Although not unique to VoIP data, tools like Wireshark 
and nmap are also quite popular. It is worth noting that in addition to malicious use, many 
of these tools can also be used for things like penetration testing in order to find 
vulnerabilities in a VoIP system before they are exploited. 
c. Risks to the Navy 
As new technologies are deployed, new ways of exploiting them for various 
malicious activities are also developed. Defending against these new attacks and fixing 
the vulnerabilities will forever be a burden to the Navy. Incorporating VoIP technology 
into Navy systems creates the potential for new exploitable vulnerabilities within those 
systems, thus increasing the risks to those systems overall. Aside from the known 
vulnerabilities related to the technology, introducing an Internet-connected VoIP network 
into the tactical communications realm could create some unique exploits of its own. 
Integrating VoIP systems with afloat radio communication systems would 
introduce new vulnerabilities into tactical communications. It would create a potential 
avenue for adversaries to eavesdrop into tactical warfighting decisions by call hijacking 
and registration hijacking. It would provide yet another way to deny communications 
altogether, through VoIP DoS and call flooding. Finally, it could create another avenue 
for degrading communications with CANCEL attacks, VoIP fuzzing, and many of the 
other methods listed above. 
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The Navy has been taking steps to move away from increasing the risk factor of 
its systems and towards reducing risk by all means necessary. The Navy has initiated 
efforts for improvement in mitigating threats to critical command and control systems, 
such as command and control in a denied or degraded environment and electromagnetic 
maneuver warfare. These efforts seek to enhance the Navy’s ability to operate in a 
contested environment. Opening more avenues for attack by incorporating exploitable 
technologies into existing systems is counter to such goals.  
With the potential to create so many new hazards, one might jump to the 
conclusion that a risk such as VoIP should not be adopted. However, even though VoIP 
does create new threat vectors, the risks are minuscule in comparison to the advantages it 
brings. VoIP threats only make up approximately 0.2 percent of the known vulnerabilities 
in all networked systems today [23]. Many of the vulnerabilities in VoIP are some of the 
same that are being defended against through various security systems and best practices 
already in place. In 2009, the CNO issued a mandate stating that we “must be organized 
to achieve the integration and innovation necessary for warfighting dominance across the 
full spectrum of operations” [28]. Like any new technology, VoIP does carry risks; 
however, through mitigation, this technology may be harnessed to help the Navy achieve 
desired warfighting dominance.  
d. Limiting the Risks (Mitigations) 
Like most protocols, VoIP was not built with security in mind, and therefore must 
rely on other protocols to provide it. As mentioned earlier, protocols like H.323 and SIP 
rely on other protocols for security, such as H.235 and TLS. Aside from leveraging more 
protocols, many types of VoIP intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems (IDS 
and IPS) have been created. Many of these systems have been geared towards mitigating 
DoS and flooding attacks as well. 
Protocols like TLS and IPSec are available for authentication and integrity 
security. Unfortunately, these protocols require additional processing, and thus can slow 
transmissions and effect voice quality. Guo et al. developed a hierarchical data security 
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protection scheme that can maintain voice quality while providing additional security 
[29]. This scheme is capable of providing both data encryption and error recovery. 
Many VoIP intrusion systems provide security through measures that are not built 
directly into the protocol. These systems include: VoIP intrusion detection systems 
(vIDS) with protocol-specific detection methodologies, VoIP flooding detection systems 
(vFDS), VoIP overload prevention mechanisms, and various other intrusion prevention 
systems tailored for VoIP traffic [26]. They are categorized as either stateful or stateless, 
and behavioral- or anomaly-based. Behavioral-based systems have low false positives but 
often fail to identify new attack types; whereas, anomaly-based systems can detect new 
attacks but generate a higher number of false positives [26]. 
Some of the vIDSs are just normal IDSs that have been put on a VoIP network or 
designed to only look at VoIP traffic. The stateful vIDS suggested by Wu et al. is a good 
example [30]. This anomaly-based vIDS determines connection states by gathering 
protocol-dependent information from packets, and matches the information to predefined 
rules. Available rules might include ones providing alerts when there is an irregular 
sequence number on consecutive RTP packets or when a specific high number of SIP 
INVITE messages have been received within a certain period of time. 
The vIDS suggested by Sengar is much more unique and specifically tailored 
towards the synchronization of VoIP traffic [24]. This behavior-based vIDS uses different 
protocol state machines to gather information on the state of a connection as well, but 
instead of just matching the information to rules, it compares synchronization information 
between the protocols to determine if the traffic is performing as designed. As an 
example, if a SIP BYE message is sent to end a call while RTP voice traffic is still being 
sent, the vIDS will detect that the conversation is no longer in-sync and an alert will be 
triggered. This technique can detect CANCEL, Call Hijack, and RTP flooding attacks, as 
well. Sengar’s vIDS does not introduce significant processing delays, call delays, or false 
positives [24]. 
Similar to circuit switched PBX systems, overloading and Call Flooding attacks 
are some of the most damaging and difficult to defend-against a VoIP system can 
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experience. A SIP proxy can maintain the state of an INVITE request for up to 3 minutes 
[26]. This leaves an extremely long window to be abused by potential flood attacks. 
Traditionally, systems from companies like Cisco and Oracle have used rate limits to 
drop calls when the traffic volume is too high. This is simple and effective; however, it 
has the potential to drop legitimate traffic, too. 
Many methods have been suggested for distinguishing flooding from flash-
crowds. Besides just using a single predefined rate limit, a more dynamic “safe limit,” 
which is governed by factors, such as server type, the number of subscribers, peak hour 
call rates, and many other parameters can be used [26]. Also, a flash crowd can be 
distinguished from a DoS attack by a much slower buildup of INVITE/ACK messages. 
Flash crowds also retransmit any unanswered INVITE requests at protocol-compliant 
back-off timer limits, whereas flood attacks do not. Finally, non-malicious INVITE 
requests will be sent to UAs with real addresses, while DoS attacks tend to be sent with 
bogus information.  
As DoS attacks have become more sophisticated, many new and innovative 
methods for detection have been developed as well. One such procedure involves 
comparing response and request rates with their long-term averages [31]. Sengar has also 
suggested a new methodology for detecting and preventing VoIP DoS [24]. Sengar’s 
vFDS looks for abnormally high amounts of RTP voice traffic in relation to the SIP 
session data being sent. He also has methods for overload prevention that work by 
randomly dropping a set of INVITE packets in an attempt to see if they are legitimate, or 
if they are just being recreated to flood a system. These methods put little drain or delay 
on the VoIP network upon which they are implemented. 
e. Limiting the Risks through Network Design 
One simple way to secure a VoIP network is to air-gap it, or segregate it from 
other networks. This may be feasible with a small infrastructure, but when using VoIP 
across multiple networks or adding VoIP to an existing network, this is not physically 
possible. VoIP traffic can, however, be logically separated from normal traffic by using a 
virtual local area network (VLAN) or similar technique. Secure voice over IP (SVoIP), 
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which uses secure phones to encrypt and transmit the conversation from end-to-end can 
also be used to achieve this segregation. Another technique is voice over secure IP 
(VoSIP) which uses secure devices elsewhere in the network to provide encryption (see 
Figure 8). An example would be using a VoIP phone on the secret IP router network 
(SIPRNet) to talk to another VoIP phone on the SIPRNet. Here the normal network 
encryptors would provide the segregation. 
 
Figure 8.  SVoIP vs. VoSIP Comparison, from [32] 
f. Limiting the Risks through Operational Policies 
Using a more secure protocol or adding a vIDS to a network will not provide 
adequate VoIP security alone. Like any hardened network, smart security practices and 
policies are also required. VoIP systems can have very similar policies to other major 
network systems ranging from log monitoring and penetration testing requirements, to 
well-defined implementation of specific VoIP protocols and protection against specific 
attacks. There are guidelines from credible organizations with suggested VoIP policies 
and procedures [33], [34]. 
Since RTP is connectionless and extremely difficult to protect with traditional 
IDSs, enforcing smart policies when implementing the protocol can help provide some 
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security. Correct implementation of secure RTP (SRTP) is one such policy [35]. If 
properly implemented, SRTP can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and 
replay protection, but key distribution in SRTP must be carefully managed in order to 
maintain confidentiality. Also, the framework must be able to upgrade to new 
cryptographic algorithms in order to avoid potential vulnerabilities in those that become 
outdated. 
There are various other VoIP- and non-VoIP-specific policies that can help 
maintain security. Ahson and Ilyas suggest the use of a Security Certificate Authority to 
verify VoIP security policies, much like a typical certificate authority verifies digital 
signatures and certificates [26]. Blacklists and white-lists based on caller reputation can 
be implemented in order to prevent VoIP SPIT traffic. There are also many generic 
network security policies and best practices that should be followed on a VoIP network 
such as changing default passwords, using an IDS or IPS, regularly patching systems, and 
following vendor checklists. 
Many national organizations have published their list of VoIP policies to provide 
the public with a baseline for securely implementing VoIP technology. Cisco’s Unified 
Communications Manager Security Guide and information assurance reports are an 
excellent resource [33]. Also, the DOD Information Assurance Certification and 
Accreditation Process (DIACAP) Package and DIACAP Scorecard can help ensure a 
DOD organization’s VoIP system is in keeping with current security practices [34].  
A more risk-oriented process, known as the DOD Information Assurance Risk 
Management Framework is currently replacing DIACAP [36]. However, VoIP guides are 
not quite the same as other available security publications, as many are old, outdated, and 
somewhat inadequate. One of the most inclusive and in-depth VoIP security publications 
available is National Institute of Standards and Technology SP800-58 (Security 
Considerations for Voice over IP systems) [37]. Although it is extremely detailed, the last 
time it was updated was in 2005. The problem of outdated guidelines includes such 
publications as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation financial institution letter 69-
2005 on Voice over Internet Protocol Guidance on the Security Risks of VoIP from 2005 
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[38], and the National Security Agency (NSA) Report Number: I332-009R-2006 on 
Recommended IP Telephony Architecture from 2006 [39]. 
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III. EXTENDING VOIP TO COMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGED 
AREAS 
This chapter identifies potential ways in which VoIP can be implemented to best 
extend tactical communications, particularly for large afloat units. Specific areas 
associated with this are: VoIP QoS, network and radio integration, and reaching the areas 
that are not easily accessible. Many of these techniques can be used individually or in 
conjunction with one another to provide reliable, high-quality tactical communications.  
A. VOIP QOS 
One of the most sought after features of any VoIP system is quality of service. 
Excellent QoS is one of the main reasons that VoIP technology has become so 
widespread. VoIP signals are able to achieve such outstanding qualities through the use 
of the codecs. A codec, which simply means coder-decoder, is a program that encodes 
and decodes (digital to analog or analog to digital) a signal for efficient transmission. In 
VoIP terminology the term codec describes the standard used to compress the signal for 
transmission. As with any compression technology, codec standards must balance a 
tradeoff between payload size, speech quality, and processing power and speed [40]. 
There are numerous different codec standards; some are proprietary and others are 
open source. Some of the most commonly used open source standards are G.711, G.729, 
and G.723.1. G.711 offers good quality with high bandwidth requirements, but requires 
no compression [40]. G.729 provides medium quality with low bandwidth requirements 
but requires more processing [40]. G.723.1 offers only medium quality with fast 
encoding and decoding and also requires a large amount of processing power [40]. Other 
available open source standards include G.728, iLBC, and Speex [41]. Available 
proprietary standards include Skype’s SILK and Microsoft’s RTAudio [42]. Figure 9 lists 




Figure 9.  VoIP Codec Standards Statistics, from [43] 
Quality of service in a packet switched network is somewhat different from that in 
a circuit switched network. Circuit switched network resources are allocated (dedicated) 
to the call. If insufficient resources are available when the call is requested the call is 
rejected. However, in a packet switched network, the resources (primarily bandwidth) are 
shared and can change throughout the duration of a call. Since VoIP is designed to run 
over packet switched networks, it has to share resources with everything else on the 
network and thus has a greater potential for transmission delay or even total denial of 
service. The three major issues this raises for voice quality in VoIP are latency, jitter, and 
packet loss. Latency is the delay in packet transmission between call-end-points [17]. 
Jitter is caused by varying latencies during a conversation [26]. Packet loss can occur for 
various reasons, but the most common culprit is congestion within the network [26]. 
These are three of the most important factors to reduce for any reliable packet switched 
network, not just VoIP. 
In order to have any merit, VoIP must offer the same, if not better QoS as the 
PSTN. To do so, latency, jitter, and packet loss must be kept below an intolerable level. 
With typical VoIP packets containing 20 milliseconds of voice on average, Porter 
suggests that latency should not be allowed to go above 150 milliseconds [17]. Ahson 




while packet loss should stay below three to five percent [26]. If a VoIP system cannot 
maintain these standards, its fidelity will be dramatically reduced, and one may be 
reluctant to use it at all. 
1. Shipboard VoIP QoS 
The correct prioritization of applications is vital for successful communications. 
As an example, the Navy’s Common Access Card management system, Real-time 
Automated Personnel Identification System (RAPIDS), experienced numerous 
communication issues when it was first deployed onboard large-deck ships [5]. These 
issues were primarily due to incorrect prioritization labels of the system’s network traffic. 
Specifically, the RAPIDS priority was too low to efficiently deliver its traffic on and off 
the ship. This, in turn, caused most of the RAPIDS traffic to be dropped and lowered 
network performance overall. The issue was resolved after laboratory testing revealed a 
more efficient higher prioritization label for the system. 
a. ADNS QoS  
To provide QoS, ADNS implements an all-IP based communications solution by 
using Cisco Weighted Random Early Detection (WRED) to prioritize TCP/IP traffic and 
by rate limiting UDP/IP traffic [5]. WRED can slow low priority traffic through the use 
of a rate control mechanism specific to TCP traffic, to provide additional bandwidth to 
high priority traffic [44]. Since WRED depends on the underlying congestion control 
mechanism employed by TCP, it does not address congestion issues caused by UDP 
traffic. 
b. ADNS UDP and VoIP QoS  
Since UDP traffic, such as VoIP, is connectionless, it is much more difficult to 
regulate the bandwidth that it consumes. In fact, “[t]here is no direct way for an IP 
network to regulate the flow of UDP” [5]. Specifically, the Type of Service field of the 
TCP header that is used to assert routing priority and preference (i.e., reliability, 
throughput, or delay) is not available with UDP. Thus, UDP traffic must be categorized 
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by some other non-standardized method, such as either IP and port number pairs or fields 
added to the application data content encapsulated by the UDP header. 
ADNS is currently configured to provide QoS for UDP traffic through a pre-
assigned allocation of bandwidth. This sets a limit on the number of UDP sessions 
allowed through the network. Any UDP traffic that surpasses the limit is dropped. This 
simply prevents the non-prioritized UDP traffic from overwhelming the prioritized TCP 
traffic. 
c. ADNS QoS between LANs 
Afloat networks support the use of multiple LANs, known as enclaves, each with 
a separate level of security. ADNS provides the management of off-ship bandwidth for 
the separate enclaves through the use of class based weighted fair queuing (CBWFQ) on 
its Cisco routers [45]. CBWFQ is a feature that provides bandwidth management between 
different user-defined classes of traffic. It works by giving one traffic level priority over 
another, and by loaning out excess bandwidth from the higher classes to the lower 
classes. This prevents a single enclave from using all of the bandwidth available. 
d. ADNS QoS within LANs 
ADNS is primarily configured to provide QoS for internetwork communications 
between the ship’s LANs and the multiple paths off-ship. It also has the capability to 
provide QoS for intra-network communications within a LAN, but this capability is not 
currently used on afloat networks. 
Effective bandwidth management within a LAN can significantly improve overall 
network performance by prioritizing application-specific traffic in a congested or 
degraded environment. This allows for limited high priority emails, or even high priority 
VoIP traffic to flow through a network during times of high usage or limited availability. 
Internetwork bandwidth management can be achieved in the same way the Blue 
Coat Packet Shaper currently uses WRED to prioritize traffic through the rate control 
marker [5], [7]. An application traffic management device can control and monitor 
prioritizations across multiple applications, much like an application-level firewall can 
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filter traffic based on the specific protocol being used. It need not understand the types of 
traffic within every application, but will only need to understand the types of traffic that 
will benefit from detailed prioritization based on the source and destination IP address 
and transport layer port entities. 
B. RADIO INTEGRATION 
Extending tactical communications from a radio to a VoIP network is not a small 
task. Typical radios are not configured to interact with VoIP and operate according to 
different non-interoperable protocols and standards. In order to translate these signals into 
something that is compatible with a VoIP system, they must be properly converted. Since 
most of the Navy’s afloat platforms are currently being upgraded to the DMR, this 
research will examine its potential for VoIP integration. 
The DMR has four digital data ports, one for each channel, that share an output 
data switch. These ports use the TIA/EIA-530 interface protocol [46]. EIA-530 is a 
Telecommunications Industry Association standard for balanced serial interfaces 
typically using a 25-pin, “D-type,” connector that is commonly used for synchronous 
signaling over long cable runs. TIA/EIA-530 signaling rates range from 0.020 Mbps to 2 
Mbps. The DMR also has four analog data ports that are used for tactical voice. These 
four lines lead to an analog audio switch. The four digital data ports and the four analog 
audio ports could be used to send either digital or analog audio to a VoIP system. 
Since VoIP systems do not interact with these types of analog audio signals, a 
converter is necessary to translate the analog audio into a VoIP-compatible signal. The 
Cisco Land Mobile Radio (LMR) Gateway was designed for this purpose [47]. It takes an 
analog audio signal on a voice interface port and converts it to RTP audio packets for 
digital transmission. Each voice interface port corresponds to a specific multicast IP 
address so that a signal can be uniquely identified on the network. A VoIP system can be 
configured to associate these multicast addresses to a specific VoIP number or even a 
conference number to communicate with everyone on the network [47]. 
Cisco is not the only company that has produced a solution for communicating 
between VoIP systems and radios. Orion Systems’ RCS-4-IP and Omnitronics’s IPR100 
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VoIP adaptor are just two examples of systems that bridge the VoIP/RF gap. These 
systems are less expensive and intricate than a typical Cisco VoIP system; however, they 
do not offer the same expandability, reliability, and capability as that offered by a Cisco 
system [48], [49]. 
C. NETWORK INTEGRATION 
Integrating a VoIP capability with an existing network may require some limited 
equipment addition, depending on whether or not a VoIP capability already exists on the 
target network, along with making some software and network configuration changes. 
The primary decision for afloat platforms, particularly those in the Navy, is whether or 
not to integrate a new VoIP system onto a pre-existing network, or to configure the 
current VoIP system to transmit tactical communications. The latter would be the logical 
choice, since it would not involve adding an additional VoIP system to a network like 
CANES that already has one. 
CANES is currently configured with Cisco-based handsets, call managers, and 
gateways. Little configuration will be required to pass tactical communications through 
the CANES network, although an IP Interoperability and Collaboration System (IPICS) 
server would need to be added to the network [50]. The IPICS server will allow virtual 
push-to-talk conferencing, so that conference channels can be established that will 
simulate radio communication circuits. Also, the VoIP handsets will need to be 
configured to get the necessary IPICS services. 
If a separate VoIP system is used for tactical communications, more equipment 
and configuration will be required. An additional call manager, IPICS Server and 
possibly new VoIP handsets will be necessary to incorporate a different system. The 
additional equipment and configuration will incur significant implementation costs that 
may outweigh any benefits of a dedicated system. 
D. COMMUNICATIONS CHALLENGED AREAS 
After tactical radio communications are integrated into the network in VoIP 
format, the audio packets must then be able to reach the intended UA, who might be a 
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user in a location that typically does not have network access. These areas include the 
well-decks of amphibious transports, far-off engineering spaces, and other areas that were 
not envisioned to have network access but could benefit from staying informed regarding 
the ship’s current tactical and operational status. A number of systems and technologies 
are available to provide network access to these areas, including Wi-Fi access points and 
handsets, Cellular, Secured Bluetooth, and the Common Optical Distribution Architecture 
(CODA) being engineered by SPAWAR Systems Center San Diego [51]. An analysis of 
Wi-Fi, Cellular and the CODA wireless systems is provided in the sections below. 
1. Wi-Fi 
Wi-Fi has evolved into one of the most common mechanisms for connecting 
mobile devices to a network. It provides a flexibility that wired networks cannot and 
allows network access from anywhere within a certain radius without cumbersome cable 
runs. 
Cisco has conducted an assessment on the ability to run VoIP through wireless 
networks onboard Navy ships with results demonstrating the existence of potential 
coverage and quality issues [52]. Wi-Fi does suffer from many of the same issues as 
wired networks as well as some unique issues. For instance, the previously discussed 
QoS issues of jitter, delay, and packet loss must be addressed. Also, Wi-Fi relies on IP 
and is thus susceptible to many of the same attacks as a wired network. Further, it opens 
avenues to new attacks, such as spoofed traffic that fails a wireless gateway’s integrity 
checks in order to make the gateway refuse a real UA for a certain period of time. Wi-Fi 
also requires efficient use of the electro-magnetic (EM) spectrum since it does not 
traverse a dedicated physical path. Another unique pitfall of Wi-Fi is that coverage is 
heavily dependent upon power available. These factors must be properly accounted for if 
Wi-Fi is to be a viable option for reliable communications. 
802.11e is a Wi-Fi standard that was developed to provide improved QoS through 
four tunable parameters: Arbitration Inter-Frame Spacing (AIFS), Contention Window 
minimum (CWmin), and Contention Window maximum (CWmax), and Transmit 
Opportunity (TXOP) [26]. AIFS helps QoS by shortening or lengthening the amount of 
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time a node must wait before transmitting its next frame. CWmin and CWmax are used to 
adjust the period that a station must wait if the channel is busy, thereby allowing for the 
optimization of the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance protocol for the 
specific wireless environment in which the system is employed. The TXOP parameter 
sets the amount of time that a station is allowed to transmit. Ahson and Ilyas suggest that 
“in order to reduce delay the AIFS parameter should be the smallest possible” [26]. They 
also suggest that the TXOP should be minimized and CWmax should be equal to CWmin 
in order to reduce queuing delays. 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the best way to transport VoIP over 
Wi-Fi. These have been performed on all iterations of the 802.11 standard, from 802.11a 
up to 802.11n. Most tests use the G.711 codec, since it produces the largest frame size as 
a worst case scenario. Researchers like Jeong et al. using the 802.11b standard, found that 
it could only handle five calls without major quality degradations [53]. Ahson and Ilyas 
found that after properly implementing the 802.11e standard, the maximum number of 
calls went from approximately eight up to eleven [26]. By using one of the most recent 
Wi-Fi standards (802.11n), Krym found that a system could maintain anywhere from 40 
to 106 VoIP sessions using the G.711 codec with 240-byte voice frames [54]. Given these 
results, VoIP over Wi-Fi appears capable of supporting the tactical communications 
requirements on naval vessels. 
Previous VoIP over Wi-Fi studies primarily focus on the 802.11b, g, and n 
standards with very few analyzing the newest Wi-Fi standard, 802.11ac. This standard 
was approved by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers in January of 2014 
[55] and offers numerous enhancements over previous versions. 802.11ac uses a large 
channel bandwidth (80 MHz and 160 MHz), higher order modulation, and an increased 
number of spatial streams to achieve increased data rates of up to 3.477 Gbps [56]. This 
is a vast improvement over previous standards. Since 802.11ac is designed with these 
advancements over previous Wi-Fi standards, it will be looked at as a potential use case 
for this research. 
One potential Wi-Fi option for extending tactical VoIP communications would be 
to utilize one wireless access point (WAP) connected directly to wireless VoIP phones. 
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This would require one WAP directly connected to the ship’s network, near the area that 
needs to receive the extended communications (i.e., the communications challenged area 
of the ship). Wi-Fi enabled VoIP phones could then be used to connect directly to the 
WAP on the ship’s network. This option is addressed during the testing portion of this 
thesis. 
The CANES Network is already equipped with WAPs that provide a secure 
wireless network. Users are required to have a National Security Agency High Assurance 
Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) Interoperability Standard-compliant device in order 
to connect to the secure network [5]. Although the capability is present, wireless 
communications afloat are still not the norm. They have been tested on Navy networks 
since 2009 but are still not being used regularly because of the potential associated 
security risks [57]. With so many concerns, the technology may not be enabled on 
CANES for some time. 
Many companies are now starting to provide wireless VoIP handsets as an option 
for connecting directly to a WAP. Two of the more popular early ones were CISCO’s 
Wi-Fi-only handset and Polycom’s SpectraLink Voice Priority handset. CISCO’s Wi-Fi-
only handsets use a proprietary protocol for communications to various CISCO WAPs. 
Many of CISCO’s new model VoIP phones now come with wired and wireless variants 
as well. The Polycom SVP also uses a proprietary protocol, but its protocol was 
developed to handle wireless QoS issues [58]. Many other wireless handsets are available 
today and are excellent options for wireless VoIP communications. 
2. Cellular 
With the development of 3G and 4G technologies, reliable cellular IP data 
transmission has become very popular, and it is now possible to use this technology to 
stream all types of multimedia to mobile devices. In particular, sending VoIP data is 
becoming widespread, offering cellular customers the ability to make wireless calls 
anywhere on the globe through a data plan while avoiding the need to use costly 
“international minutes.” This same technology can be implemented in a shipboard 
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environment to wirelessly extend tactical VoIP communications, particularly in 
international waters where frequency licensing is not an issue. 
The most current cellular standards are 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 
and 3GPP2, also known as 3G, LTE and Ultra-mobile Broadband, also known as 4G. 3G 
uses standards such as Evolution Data Optimized to provide high-speed packet delivery 
while 4G uses technologies such as Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access 
[26]. 
In order to combat many of the same QoS issues that affect other wireless 
technologies, cellular has developed unique ways for improving RF capacity and wireless 
performance. The Enhanced Variable Rate Codec was created to combat the large 
fluctuation in cellular network activity. It uses a rate reduction mechanism to alter its 
encoding rate based on talking activity [26]. Another QoS improvement for cellular is 
known as hybrid automatic repeat request, which aims to increase transmission 
efficiency. With so many enhancements to QoS and its growing popularity, cellular is 
poised to be an excellent way to pass VoIP traffic to specific locations. 
3. Common Optical Distribution Architecture 
There are numerous other wireless technologies that may offer potential to extend 
shipboard networks such as WiMAX, Bluetooth, and infrared [51]2. Systems are being 
created that incorporate various combinations of these technologies to provide an 
integrated solution. The Navy has been developing one of these systems for shipboard 
use, called the Common Optical Distribution Architecture (CODA). 
The CODA was designed by SPAWAR System Center Pacific’s shipboard 
wireless communications division, to consolidate numerous wired and wireless media 
onto a single network. Instead of having a segregated group of networks for various 
systems, CODA consolidates them onto one network through the high capacity 
capabilities of fiber optics. Various systems data can be fed into the CODA head end and 
                                                 
2 CODA is currently a developmental Navy system. It is not yet a program of record. The facts 
provided in section “c” are from the October 2013 CODA Executive Brief, and statements taken from 
system developers Brian Lovell and Rowell Bacani at SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific. [51] 
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then seamlessly delivered to multiple endpoints throughout the ship at near light speed. 
Each end point is currently being designed to deliver the following types of signals: 4G 
LTE, Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications wireless phones, radio frequency 
identification, Wi-Fi, IP video, UHF RF, IP telephony, and more. 
CODA offers numerous benefits by incorporating many systems into one medium 
rather than having each one segregated. Some of these advantages are increased power 
efficiency, RF flexibility, better security, scalability, and space and weight reductions. Its 
modular design makes it easy to incorporate current and legacy technologies, as well as 
expand to those that are developed in the future. Further, the proposed switched fiber 
infrastructure offers redundant paths to ensure survivability. CODA would be an 
excellent solution for extending tactical VoIP communications within afloat platforms. 
E. EXTENDING VOIP SUMMARY 
The technologies discussed above are all capable options for passing VoIP data to 
communications challenged areas onboard ships without requiring additional wiring. 
Each has numerous benefits that can be exploited. Wi-Fi is already commonly used to 
efficiently transmit VoIP data and is straightforward to implement in standard IP 
networks. Cellular networks are increasing in popularity in the consumer market, and 
offer numerous technologies for improved QoS. Systems like CODA can offer numerous 
options for IP data transmission, and are presently being developed for shipboard 
deployment.  
The next chapter provides a proof-of-concept design and test strategy to explore 
the VoIP utility for wirelessly extending shipboard communications. It will compare the 
above mentioned 802.11n and 802.11ac wireless protocols, as well as the wired Ethernet 
link layer protocol. 
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IV. TEST DESIGN AND EXECUTION 
This chapter identifies the architecture used, and the tests conducted to assess the 
feasibility of extending tactical communications through secure wireless VoIP networks. 
The tests were designed to not only assess the capabilities and limitations of these 
networks, but to evaluate the overall performance of the 802.11n and 802.11ac Wi-Fi 
protocols as well. 
A. DEMO TEST BED 
The test bed consisted of three major sections: the client, the access point, and the 
server. The client machine was used to simulate an end device connecting to a VoIP 
network. The access point acted as the means of routing VoIP communications from the 
client to the server. Finally, the server was used for multiple functions throughout the 
testing including VoIP call manager, VoIP IDS, traffic generation, and traffic analysis. 
Figure 10 depicts the three major components and their functions. 
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Figure 10.  Logical Design of VoIP Test Bed Components and Functions 
The client machine was a Hewlett-Packard Pavilion dv7 with a 2.27 GHz Dual 
Core Intel i5 processor and 4 Gigabytes of random access memory (RAM) running the 
Windows 8.1 64-bit operating system. The two main applications used for testing were 
JPerf 2.0.2 and Zoiper 3.2. JPerf is a network performance measurement and traffic 
generating tool. Zoiper is a popular VoIP softphone that supports various VoIP features, 
protocols, and codecs. 
The access point was a Linksys WRT1900AC Wireless AC Router. The following 
link protocols were used in the experiments: wired Ethernet, 802.11n, 2.4 GHz 802.11ac 
and 5GHz 802.11ac. The Linksys Smart Wi-Fi application was used for configuring the 
router’s wireless signal properties, wireless security properties, and various other settings. 
The VoIP server was a Dell Latitude E6510 with a 1.60 GHz Quad Core Intel i7 
processor and 8 Gigabytes of RAM running the Windows 7 64-bit operating system. The 
VoIP softphone applications used were Zoiper 3.2, X-Lite 4.7.0, and SJphone 1.65.2637. 
Network traffic analysis was conducted using Wireshark 1.10.8. JPerf 2.0.2 was used for 
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network performance monitoring and traffic generation with the client machine. Finally, 
VMware Workstation 9.0.4 was used to create the virtual machine which hosted the VoIP 
Proxy Server and IDS. 
Trixbox 2.8.0.4 was used as the virtual VoIP Proxy Server. Trixbox is a complete 
VoIP phone system package that includes CentOS Linux, MySQL, a web server, an 
Asterisk PBX, and various other applications. The K Desktop Environment was installed 
for ease of access. Snort 2.9.6.2 was also installed on the virtual machine to function as 
the vIDS. The Snort application was put in Network Intrusion Detection System Mode 
with the packet display, logging, and alert options enabled whenever it was in use. 
B. TEST DESIGN AND EXPECTED RESULTS 
Seven sets of tests were performed upon VoIP traffic within four different link 
protocols in an attempt to determine the capabilities, limitations, and feasibility of each. 
1. Network Baseline 
Before starting the various VoIP tests bellow, it was necessary to observe how the 
test network performed without any VoIP calls being processed. This created a baseline 
for comparing the network behavior and performance of VoIP traffic. Wireshark was 
used to capture and measure the average network traffic (i.e., bits per second) during 
various 30-second intervals in which no VoIP data was transmitted. 
Since the network baseline test was only analyzing non-VoIP traffic and there was 
not a lot of network activity required when not processing VoIP calls, it was expected to 
show very little traffic overall. 
2. Network Throughput 
This test was designed to examine the overall throughput of the various link 
protocols within the network. This showed the capabilities and limitations of the different 
types of transmission media. In this test four types of link transmission protocols 
(Ethernet, 802.11n, 2.4 GHz 802.11ac, and 5 GHz 802.11ac) were examined. JPerf was 
used to send as many TCP/IP packets from client to server, as possible. The specific JPerf 
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settings used for the throughput test were as follows: one parallel stream, 30 second 
intervals, TCP protocol, 64 KB buffer length, 56 KB TCP window size, 1 KB max 
segment size, TCP no delay unchecked and all default IP layer options.  The test was run 
on each link protocol, until a consistent average throughput was obtained. 
Since nothing else was supposed to be happening on the network, this test was 
expected to show results with numbers very close to the maximum capacities of the four 
different link protocols. Wireless protocols can be affected by numerous environmental 
variables which would likely affect the tests as well. This expectation is captured well by 
the Linksys wireless products disclaimer that states: 
Actual performance can vary, including lower wireless network capacity, 
data throughput rate, range and coverage. Performance depends on many 
factors, conditions and variables, including distance from the access point, 
volume of network traffic, building materials and construction, operating 
system used, mix of wireless products used, interference and other adverse 
conditions [59]. 
Consequently, the test network would likely have shown rates lower than each link 
protocol’s stated maximum. 
3. VoIP Throughput 
The VoIP throughput test examined the average bandwidth consumption of a 
typical VoIP call using a SIP proxy server. By calculating the typical bandwidth usage of 
one VoIP call, a maximum call capacity for each protocol type was determined as well. 
This was done by observing the average maximum throughput of each link protocol 
during a single VoIP call. Since VoIP server capabilities were outside of the scope of this 
research, this test did not take in to account whether or not the server was actually able to 
efficiently process all of those calls. 
Before testing the bandwidth consumption of a VoIP call, three separate popular 
VoIP softphone applications were examined: SJphone, Zoiper and X-Lite. This was done 
in order to find the software that gave the most consistent results. In the end, Zoiper was 
used because of its consistency, many features, and user-friendly interface. Zoiper’s  
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default audio Codec (G.711 A-law) was used. After the softphone was chosen, Wireshark 
was used to calculate the average amount of VoIP traffic being sent during a 30-second 
VoIP call. 
Since each VoIP codec has a specific packet size and packets per second (pps), 
the test was expected to show that the VoIP traffic had the same rate as the codec being 
used. In this case the codec was G.711 A-law, which has a 160 byte packet and is 
supposed to send each packet at 50 pps. This means the tests should have resulted in a 
VoIP throughput of both transmitting and receiving 0.064 Mbps for each user agent on a 
call. 
4. Additional Network Traffic 
This test was designed to examine the effects of non-VoIP network traffic on 
VoIP call throughput. JPerf was used to send specified amounts of generic UDP traffic 
from the client to the server. The traffic generated was intended to simulate the average 
traffic seen within the network of a typical Navy aircraft carrier and was based on the 
actual numbers used for simulating traffic in the SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific 
network labs [60]. The three amounts generated were based on a percentage of the 
average network traffic seen on a typical Navy carrier: 60 percent of the average was 
1.575 Mbps; 80 percent of the average was 2.163 Mbps; and 100 percent of the average 
was 2.699 Mbps. Wireshark was used to measure the average network bandwidth during 
30-second intervals of various call types, while the different levels of traffic were being 
generated. 
Since the additional traffic data rate was so low in comparison to the maximum 
capable data rates for the link protocols used, little-to-no effect upon the network’s VoIP 
traffic was expected.  
5. VoIP Codecs 
The VoIP codec test examined the different network effects of five separate types 
of popular codecs: G.711 A-law, G.711 U-law, Global System for Mobile 
Communications (GSM), Speex, and Internet Low Bitrate Codec 30 (iLBC30). For this 
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test, each codec was used to generate one call with the SIP proxy during three separate 
30-second intervals. Wireshark was then used to measure the average bits per frame and 
pps of the different types of VoIP traffic being sent during all three intervals. This 
information was then used to determine the actual data rates generated by each codec. 
These results should have been similar to those of the VoIP throughput test in that 
each codec should have had a data rate closely related to its packet size multiplied by its 
pps rate. 
6. VoIP Calls 
This test analyzed the effects of various call types, amounts, times, and functions. 
Different combinations of end-to-end calls and conference calls were examined to see if 
they performed differently across the network. JPerf was used to simulate the presence of 
simultaneous calls in sets ranging from two to 50. 30-second and 60-second intervals 
were tested to see if the length of the call made a difference on network performance. The 
effects of functions like “mute” and “hold” were tested as well. In all cases, Wireshark 
was used to capture and analyze the average network consumption of VoIP traffic. 
The VoIP conference call (i.e., a call hosted by the VoIP server and not a UA) 
would likely have consumed half the amount of bandwidth as the normal call, since it 
only involves one UA. The VoIP network throughput would have likely increased 
proportionally with the number VoIP calls ongoing at any one time. The length of a VoIP 
call was expected to have little effect, since VoIP data rates do not vary over time. 
Finally, the VoIP functions such as “mute” and “hold” were expected to have little 
impact, because VoIP packet data rates are dependent upon the codec used instead of 
audio levels. 
7. vIDS Effects 
The vIDS test analyzed how a vIDS affects the performance of VoIP traffic 
traversing a network. This test compared the data rates of various amounts of VoIP traffic 
while the vIDS was on and off. Wireshark was used to examine the different 30-second 
intervals of vIDS and non-vIDS usage. The test also compared the effects of a vIDS on 
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the maximum network throughput using the four link protocols tested earlier. This was 
done by having JPerf send as many TCP/IP packets as possible from the client to the 
server. Snort was used as the vIDS. It is a very effective IDS with numerous VoIP attack 
definitions. Its purpose was not to actually detect VoIP attacks, rather to test how a vIDS 
affects VoIP call performance on a network. 
Since the vIDS was only being used passively and not actually blocking malicious 
traffic, it was expected to have little effect on the flow of VoIP data through the test 
network. However, since the throughput test was designed to send as many TCP packets 
across the network as possible, the vIDS would likely see this as an attack and generate 
alerts accordingly. With the vIDS machine processing so much data, the performance of 
the proxy server on the same machine might be reduced as well, thus reducing the 
throughput of VoIP network traffic overall. 
C. TEST DESIGN AND EXECUTION SUMMARY 
The tests conducted for this research were designed to assess the feasibility of 
extending tactical communications using afloat naval networks. Specifically, tests were 
geared towards using wireless networks to extend VoIP traffic to potential hard-to-reach 
areas onboard large deck naval platforms. The tests compared the capabilities, 
limitations, and overall performance of various VoIP network configurations in order to 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. RESULTS 
Seven major groups of tests were performed to analyze the capabilities, 
limitations, and overall performance of VoIP within different types of networks. A 
detailed analysis of the seven sets of tests are given in the following subsections. 
1. Network Baseline 
This test used Wireshark to observe demo network performance without any VoIP 
calls being processed by measuring the average throughput of all network traffic during 
three separate 30-second intervals. The test showed that a very low amount of traffic was 
being sent over the network while inactive. On average, only 0.0078 Mbps of data was 
sent. This ranged anywhere from broadcast traffic being sent to maintain routing paths, to 
traffic from the virtual machine to maintain connectivity. 
2. Network Throughput 
This test used JPerf to examine the overall throughput of the various link 
protocols by sending as many TCP/IP packets, from client to server, as possible. The test 
was run between five and ten times for each protocol, until a consistent range of values 
was detected. The high, low and average throughputs for each protocol are shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1.   Low, High, and Average Protocol Throughput in Mbps 
 Low High Average 
Ethernet 613 641 627 
802.11n 33.4 40.0 36.7 
2.4 GHz 802.11ac 59.4 82.6 71 
5 GHz 802.11ac 89.7 91.0 90.35 
 
The data shows that 802.11n is the least capable link protocol, with an average 
throughput of 36.7 Mbps. 2.4 GHz 802.11ac has double the capacity at an average of 71 
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Mbps. 5 GHz 802.11ac has nearly three times the throughput of 802.11n with an average 
throughput of 90.4 Mbps. Finally, wired Ethernet had 17 times the capacity of 802.11n at 
an average of 627 Mbps. 
None of the results revealed capacities approaching their advertised capabilities: 1 
Gbps for Ethernet, 600 Mbps for 802.11n, and 867 Mbps for 802.11ac [59]. This could be 
due to a number of factors. One factor would be that in the Ethernet test, the router may 
have been capable of a larger throughput, but the actual machines sending and receiving 
the data may not have been able to process it at such great speeds. The wireless networks 
(especially the 802.11ac network) were performing much lower than what was expected. 
The wireless tests were likely affected by factors such as distance between end points, 
building design and material signal absorption, wireless interference, router 
misconfiguration, and other adverse conditions. Many of these wireless factors have been 
tested in complementary thesis research performed by Anibal Intini titled “Performance 
of Wireless Networks in Highly Reflective Rooms with Variable Absorption” [61]. 
3. VoIP Throughput 
This test used Wireshark to determine the average bandwidth consumption of a 
typical VoIP call using a SIP proxy server. After recording the traffic generated during 30 
seconds of a VoIP call (see figure 11), Wireshark’s conversation statistics were used to 
calculate the average amount of traffic being sent in four directions: from UAC to SIP 
server, from SIP Server to UAC, from UAS to SIP Server, and from SIP Server to UAS. 
Test results from conversations recorded during a 30-second capture of 2 simultaneous 
VoIP calls are shown in Figure 12. For this test, the UAC was at IP address 
192.168.1.146, the SIP Server had IP address 192.168.1.126, and the UAS’s IP address 
was 192.168.1.117.  
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Figure 11.  Wireshark VoIP Call Snapshot 
 
Figure 12.  Wireshark Conversation Statistics for 2 VoIP Calls 
After performing this test on numerous 30-second periods of a single VoIP call, it 
was determined that the average amount of VoIP network traffic was 0.334 Mbps. This 
was composed of 0.0835 Mbps of VoIP traffic in each of the four directions described 
above. This is somewhat higher than the expected value of 0.064 Mbps. This was due to 
 52 
the fact that the VoIP packets were actually 1,712 bits in size versus the 1,280 bit size 
stated by the G.711 standard. This makes sense, considering the fact that the IP packets 
included 1,376 bits of application data, a 64 bit UDP header, a 160 bit IPv4 header and 
112 bits of link layer header and footer data. The actual amount of application data 
transmitted was 1,376 bits vice 1,280 bits indicating an additional 96 bits of non-voice 
data per packet, likely consisting of application layer header information. 
4. Additional Network Traffic 
This test used JPerf and Wireshark to determine the effects of non-VoIP network 
traffic on VoIP call throughput. The three amounts of additional non-VoIP traffic tested 
were 1.575 Mbps, 2.163 Mbps, and 2.699 Mbps. The results showing the total average 
network consumption of a VoIP call with different levels of additional network traffic are 
shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.  Network Consumption with Increasing Traffic in Mbps 
These results show that network consumption increases in parallel with increasing 
levels of traffic. When 1.575 Mbps of traffic were added, overall network consumption 
went up by nearly the same rate as when no network traffic was introduced. The 2.163 
and 2.699 Mbps traffic levels show similar results. This indicates that additional network 







traffic increases bandwidth consumption additively. This means that the overall VoIP call 
capacity is reduced by one for every 0.334 Mbps of additional network traffic. 
5. VoIP Codecs 
This test used Wireshark to examine VoIP throughput using five different codec 
standards: G.711 A-law, G.711 U-law, GSM, Speex, and iLBC30. The results of the test 
are shown in Figure 14. 
  
Figure 14.  VoIP Throughput per Codec Standard in Mbps 
The results for this test are similar to the results from the original VoIP 
throughput test. Each codec standard shows a rate slightly higher than what was 
expected. G.711 had rates of 0.0835 and 0.0853 Mbps when it was expected to have 
application layer data at a fixed rate of 0.064 Mbps. GSM had a rate of 0.035 Mbps vice 
the expected variable rate of around 0.0122 Mbps. Speex had a rate of 0.0315, while its 
standard is designed to use a variable rate between 0.002 and 0.044 Mbps. Finally, 
iLBC30 resulted in a rate of 0.03 Mbps when it is designed to function at a fixed rate of 
0.013 Mbps. The higher rates are due to the addition of IP and UDP header information, 
such as source, destination, protocol, checksum, etc. This means each codec standard was 
actually operating within its design specifications. 





6. VoIP Calls 
This test used Wireshark to analyze the effects of VoIP call types and functions 
such as end-to-end versus conference calls, “mute,” and “hold.” Figures 15 and 16 show 
the throughputs seen in each test.  
 
Figure 15.  Throughput Comparison of Simultaneous VoIP Calls in Mbps 
This tests reveals an apparent equality between simultaneous VoIP calls. VoIP 
throughput consumption increases by around 0.35 Mbps when another call is added to the 
network. This shows a linear growth trend in throughput consumption versus the number 
of VoIP calls. Also, the tested values show a minor increase over what was expected. 
This was largely due to the fact that the program producing the simultaneous streams of 
traffic sent small amounts of additional traffic used to monitor the progress of each 
stream. 
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Figure 16.  Throughput of Various VoIP Call Types and Features in Mbps 
These results show a number of different characteristics of VoIP calls.  A 
conference call consumes about half of the bandwidth (0.167 Mbps) of a normal VoIP 
call. This makes perfect sense, considering each participant in a conference call speaks 
directly to, and not through, the VoIP server. It increases linearly (from 0.167 to 0.341 to 
0.506 Mbps) as the number of conference calls increases. This linear trend seems to hold 
with different combinations of full end-to-end calls and conference calls as well. These 
results show that for every one-way VoIP call, an additional 0.167 Mbps of bandwidth is 
consumed. 
The testing also showed interesting results for the “mute” and “hold” features. 
Whenever a UA puts a call on “mute” the normal amount of VoIP traffic is still sent and 
received. However, whenever a UA puts a call on “hold” that UA will no longer be 
sending or receiving VoIP traffic. This shows that it is more efficient to put calls on 






1 Call + 1 Conference
1 Call + 2 Conferences
1 End on Hold















7. vIDS Effects 
This test used Wireshark and JPerf to analyze how a vIDS affects the performance 
of VoIP traffic on a network, as well as its effects on network performance overall. 
Figures 17 through 20 show the results of the throughput tests on the different link 
protocols with and without the use of a vIDS. Each figure shows a high and low range, 
and average throughput in Mbps. Four sets of tests were performed for each link protocol. 
One set was for throughput while the vIDS was running and a VoIP call was in progress. 
Another set was for throughput while a vIDS was running but while no VoIP calls were 
in progress. The last two were identical to the first sets, although they were performed 
without the vIDS running at all. 
 
Figure 17.  Ethernet vIDS Throughput Range in Mbps 
The Ethernet test resulted in very high throughputs with huge variances overall. 
The larger variances were seen while the vIDS was running; 325 and 244 Mbps while 
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while the vIDS was running. This shows that a vIDS may adversely affect network 
performance. Also, there did not seem to be any correlation between throughput and 
whether or not a call was in progress. 
 
Figure 18.  802.11n vIDS Throughput Range in Mbps 
The tests on the 802.11n protocol had the lowest throughput results overall. These 
showed trends similar to those in the Ethernet tests. There was a decrease in network 
performance while the vIDS was on, and calls seem to have minimal effects on 
throughput. However, there were larger variances in throughput while the vIDS was off; 
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Figure 19.  802.11ac (2.4 GHz) vIDS Throughput Range in Mbps 
The results for the 2.4GHz 802.11ac protocol were slightly different than the 
others. There were no clear trends associated with throughput and the vIDS being on or 
off, or whether calls were being progressed or not. The only observable characteristic was 
that there were larger variances while the vIDS was off; 17.1 and 23.2 Mbps while off, 
versus 3.3 and 8.7 Mbps while turned on. This was similar to the 802.11n tests but 
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Figure 20.  802.11ac (5GHz) vIDS Throughput Range in Mbps 
The final throughput tests were on the 5 GHz 802.11ac protocol. These showed 
very different results from the other tests. There were higher throughputs while the vIDS 
was running, having a call in progress had no major effect, and there were small 
variances throughout; 3.3, 4.0, 5.8 and 1.3 Mbps shown from left to right in Figure 20. 
Figure 21 shows the combined results of all of the wireless protocol tests. 
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Figure 21.  Combined Wireless vIDS Throughput Ranges in Mbps 
Overall, the test results show some interesting aspects of using a vIDS, the most 
obvious being that the faster the protocol the higher the throughput whether or not a vIDS 
is running. Another aspect is that running a vIDS does not seem to have a major effect on 
wireless protocols overall, nor does it matter if calls are in progress while running the 
vIDS. The 2.4 GHz 802.11ac protocol did not seem to have very consistent network 
throughput with or without the use of a vIDS. Lastly, the Ethernet link protocol seemed 
to be affected the most by the use of a vIDS, both in the average throughput and the 












Wireless vIDS Throughput 
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B. LESSONS LEARNED 
There were many interesting takeaways from the testing process. Most of these 
had to do with Wi-Fi optimization, which was not the focus of this research. It was, 
however, important to gathering consistent results. Specifically, these lessons learned had 
to do with network configurations and led to the following list of configuration 
recommendations: change to the least used wireless channel in your operating area; find a 
space with as little EM interference as possible; keep a consistent distance from the 
access point; do not place the end device close (less than 15 feet) to the access point; stay 
clear of objects blocking the path; and run the tests long enough to obtain consistent 
results (60 seconds or longer). 
Another lesson learned was that different VoIP softphone programs behave very 
differently. Some produce audio delays while others may not. Some implement different 
codec standards than others. Some programs implement the “mute” and “hold” functions 
differently (i.e., whether or not the function continues to transmit and receive data). 
Another major difference among VoIP softphones is that some have features (e.g., push-
to-talk, security) that others do not. The primary lesson learned from this is that a 
consistent and dependable application that has all of the features and codec standards 
being tested is required. 
One final lesson learned had to do with how Wireshark summarizes the average 
throughput during a capture. Wireshark has numerous ways of viewing network 
throughput for packet captures. One way is through the “Summary” tool. This tool gives 
many relevant statistics, one of which is the total average throughput. This is not always 
consistent with other throughput statistics in the program. The “Conversations” tool list 
average throughput per protocol and for each IP address. When these are all summed up, 
they do not always equal the same value given by the “Summary” tool. It is unclear how 
Wireshark calculates the average total throughput. The main lesson learned from this 
highlights the importance of understanding the data being analyzed. In this case, use of 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis analyzed multiple aspects of communications systems, networks, VoIP 
systems, protocols and security. It attempted to determine the feasibility of integrating 
these systems to extend tactical communications afloat. The tests were designed and 
conducted to provide statistical information towards this end. 
The tests reveal that VoIP network traffic consumes around 0.334 Mbps of 
throughput on average for one call using the G.711 codec standard. This number changes 
according to the codec standard used. The results also indicate a linear rate change 
between the number of calls in progress and network throughput consumption. Some 
other important findings were that the 5 GHz 802.11ac wireless link protocol out 
performs other 802.11-derived wireless protocols and is able to handle an average 
throughput of around 90.4 Mbps or approximately 270 VoIP phone calls. Consuming the 
entire network’s bandwidth would introduce issues not addressed in this research, 
notwithstanding, these results demonstrate the capability of an 802.11ac network for this 
purpose. Another interesting result from the testing was that implementing a vIDS on a 
wireless VoIP network has little effect on network performance overall. 
To determine if a wireless VoIP solution would be feasible for extending tactical 
communications afloat, its capabilities, limitations, and applicability must be understood. 
Many of the capabilities and limitations have already been discussed. To grasp the 
applicability of such a system, the capabilities of a typical tactical communications 
system must also be understood. The primary afloat tactical communications system 
currently used in the Navy, the DMR, is capable of supporting up to 128 simultaneous 
channels. As shown, a VoIP system should be able to support as many calls. 
The wireless VoIP system tested in this thesis had the capacity for 270 
simultaneous calls and was more than capable of handling a robust VoIP architecture. 
Therefore, a wireless VoIP system using the 5 GHz 802.11ac link protocol is a viable 
solution for solving the issue of extending tactical communication afloat. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to extend tactical communications within afloat platforms, it is 
recommended that a vIDS-monitored wireless VoIP system such as the one outlined in 
Figure 22, be integrated with current afloat communications systems and networks. Since 
afloat networks already have some Cisco VoIP components, it would be most beneficial 
if the additional components were Cisco-compatible products. 
 
Figure 22.  Recommended Afloat Tactical Integrated VoIP System 
A call manager is recommended to handle call processing and configuration of all 
networked VoIP devices. Specifically, a device commensurate with the Cisco 2900 or 
3900 series call managers should be used. A LMR Gateway is recommended for 
converting between digital VoIP traffic and audio formatted for radio transmitters. This 
should also be of similar capability to a Cisco 2900 or 3900 series device. An IPICS 
Server is recommended to provide capabilities such as push-to-talk, conferencing, and 
admin/policy configuration. The IPICS server could be run on the same device as the 
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LMR Gateway, depending on the amount of traffic it needs to support. Figure 23 depicts 
how an IPICS server can support a highly heterogeneous VoIP network.  
  
Figure 23.  Cisco IPICS Services, from [50] 
Some other recommended components for this system would be a wireless access 
point, wireless adapter, VoIP end-devices, and a vIDS. The wireless access point should 
be any 5 GHz 802.11ac device, capable of handling a minimum of 128 simultaneous 
VoIP channels. The wireless adapter is only necessary if the end devices are not Wi-Fi 
capable. The wireless adapter should also be a 5 GHz 802.11ac compatible device. The 
end-devices could be anything from a softphone on a laptop to a wireless handheld VoIP 
phone. The primary recommendation for the end-devices is that they use an efficient, 
variable bit-rate codec, such as Speex or GSM. Finally, a sophisticated vIDS is 
recommended in order to mitigate the potential security vulnerabilities of the VoIP 
system. A multiprotocol and multistate aware vIDS similar to the one suggested by 
Sengar [24] is recommended for this highly integrated system. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
This research was focused on comparing the capabilities and limitations of the 
four link protocols used, with an end goal of determining the most feasible VoIP 
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architecture for extending tactical communications afloat. However, there are still many 
topics that can be assessed for transmission of tactical communications through VoIP 
networks. Some of these additional research topics include radio integration; VoIP 
protocol comparisons; vIDS capabilities and limitations; Wi-Fi optimization and 
emissions control; and full scale simulation of integrated VoIP, radio, and network 
systems. 
1. Radio Integration 
VoIP radio integration should be further studied to better understand not only how 
to integrate specific radio systems with VoIP systems but also to learn the capabilities 
and limitations that come from integrating these two audio transmissions systems as well. 
This would involve a detailed study of current VoIP and radio integrated systems. This 
research should examine the technologies used to convert digital VoIP audio data into 
analog RF transmissions. A comparison and test of different VoIP over radio solutions 
would be useful as well. 
2. VoIP Protocol Comparison 
A detailed VoIP protocol comparison would be extremely helpful in order to 
determine the most efficient and secure means of transmitting VoIP data across wired and 
wireless networks. This research should examine past, present, and emerging VoIP 
protocols beyond SIP and H.323. It would need to look at both public and proprietary 
protocols. This study should also involve an examination of the supporting protocols used 
at different layers of the TCP/IP stack. Another area to be covered by this research would 
be a comparison of VoIP codec standards. An assessment and test of the capabilities and 
limitations of a variety of popular VoIP protocols should accompany the research as well. 
3. vIDS Capabilities and Limitations 
Further research in the area of VoIP security systems would be beneficial to this 
and future studies. Such research should analyze the capabilities, limitations, and 
accuracy of different vIDS and vIPS applications. Real-world production systems and 
conceptual systems should both be studied. The research should compare traditional IDS 
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and IPS systems designed to analyze VoIP and non-VoIP traffic, as well as vIDS and 
vIPS systems specifically designed for VoIP traffic only. The study should include a test 
of a variety of different IDS an IPS systems against a variety of malicious and non-
malicious VoIP attacks. Security ramifications beyond vIDS integration are also of 
concern; in particular, the impact of encryption of the VoIP traffic should be investigated 
to assess whether the underlying VoIP protocols are sensitive to delays that might be 
caused by the encryption technology used. While not addressed directly by this thesis, 
such performance impacts are of particular concern to operators. 
4. Wi-Fi Optimization 
Another supporting research topic would be Wi-Fi optimization in afloat 
platforms. This study should compare current and past technologies and techniques used 
on board military and commercial vessels. It should identify the unique aspects of using 
wireless technologies at sea, as opposed to on land. It should examine a variety of case 
studies of organizations which adopted Wi-Fi technology on afloat platforms. The study 
should test some of the methods and technologies revealed during the research and 
compare the overall benefits of each. There have already been detailed studies performed 
on parts of this topic [52], which could be further expanded upon as well. 
5. Full Scale VoIP Integration Test 
A major future work study that could complement this thesis research would be a 
full-scale simulation of the suggested VoIP architecture. This could involve integrating a 
Cisco demo kit [62], with a LMR, an afloat radio system, and a wireless network. This 
study could even go as far as integrating a wireless VoIP system with a ship’s network 
and radios, in order to simulate real world usage. However it is performed, a full-scale 
test would be the most beneficial way of discovering accurate capabilities, limitations, 
and interoperability of an integrated wireless VoIP system afloat. 
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